Subject: Iraq's invasion of Kuwait engineered by US
Date: Sunday, November 8, 2009, 11:59 AM
I cannot overemphasize the importance of the following article. It deserves a complete read. Due to it's length, I've synopsized it immediately below.
Especially in relation to the recent tragic shooting at Ft. Hood, it is crucial to remember that Saddam Hussein brutally suppressed and imprisoned islamic extremists/jihadists of any sect (Wahabbist, Sunni or Shiite); that in pre-US-invasion Iraq, Christians and Muslims lived side-by-side peacefully; that Saddam's second-in-command was Christian; and that, in it's war against Iraq, the US allied with countries (Saudi Arabia) where you would be executed for possessing a Bible.
Now, the synopsis of the article. The US did the following:
a. Encouraged Kuwait to make provocative moves against Iraq, to instgate a conflict. These moves included (but were not limited to) Kuwait's slant-drilling (with US-provided technology) into Iraq's oil fields; Kuwait's illegally over-extracting oil from fields it shared with Iraq; and Kuwait demanding immediate payment of loans from the Iran-Iraq war (a war for which Kuwait and the US sold arms to both sides).
b. Encouraged Kuwait to refuse to negotiate with Iraq over these issues, to provoke Iraq into military action.
c. Began in January, 1990, the US moved massive quantities of weapons and materiel into Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, in preparation for war against Iraq.
d. In July, 1990 the US assured Saddam that, if he invaded Kuwait, the US would not intervene .
"King Hussein of Jordan ... found Kuwait’s [instigatory moves] perplexing... 'really puzzling...'"
Yasser Arafat...stated “The U.S. was encouraging Kuwait not to offer any compromise which meant that there could be no negotiated solution to avoid the Persian Gulf crisis.”
“Schwarzkopf was [in Kuwait] on visits before the war, maybe a few times a year. He was a political general, and that was unusual in itself. He kept a personally high profile and was on a first-name basis with all the ministers in Kuwait.”
"In October 1990, [Colin] Powell referred to the new military plan developed in 1989."
“in his prewar period”, Saddam Hussein “did more than most rulers in that part of the world to meet the basic material needs of his people in terms of housing, healthcare and education ... Iraq's impressive infrastructure and strongly nationalistic ideology led many Arabs to conclude that the overkill exhibited by American forces and the postwar sanctions was a deliberate effort to emphasize that any development strategy in that part of the world must be pursued solely on terms favorable to Western interests."
“the majority of Iraqi civilians enjoyed an almost First World-level standard of living, with education and health care systems that remained free, accessible to every Iraqi and among the highest quality in the developing world.”
Setting the American Trap for Saddam Hussein (Part 2) The 1991 Gulf Massacre
by Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed*
In the second part of his study Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed offers a behind-the-scenes account of the 1991 Gulf War revealing that, contrary to conventional opinion, there exists considerable evidence to indicate that the Gulf War had not only been anticipated by the United States, but fell well within its political, strategic and economic interests. A variety of factors, both within the U.S. and the Middle East, appear to support the conclusion that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was deliberately engineered by the U.S. to provide a pretext for war.
George H.W. Bush riding in an armored jeep with General ’Stormin’ Norman Schwarzkopf in Saudi Arabia, 22 November 1990
Part One: The Historical & Strategic Context of Western Terrorism in The Gulf
IV. Protecting Order in the Gulf
IV.I The Domestic Scene in the U.S.
Prior to the Gulf War, the United States was facing massive cutbacks in military expenditure. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. had lost its old Cold War foe, leaving its military institutions such as NATO with nothing left to do – or at least no credible pretext on which to do it. Consequently, a political conflict had begun within the U.S. over the issue of the necessity of defence spending. With the Cold War over, many outside the U.S. military establishment naturally called for the reduction of military expenditure.
In February 1990, the Washington Post reported that “the administration and Congress are expecting the most acrimonious, hard-fought defense budget battle in recent history”.  By June, the Post reported that “tensions have escalated” between the Congress and the Pentagon, “as Congress prepares to draft one of the most pivotal defense budgets in the past two decades” . By July, due to the vote of a Senate Armed Services subcommittee calling for cuts in military manpower almost three times that of Bush’s recommendations, it appeared that the Pentagon was losing the battle for military spending. The Los Angeles Times reported: “The size and direction of the [military] cuts indicate that President Bush is losing his battle on how to manage reductions in military spending.” 
Being Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, former CIA Director, and a former investor in Texas oil, Bush was instrumental in fighting against such reductions. Yet while he was drastically failing to secure high U.S. military spending, his domestic popularity was also drastically decreasing. Although in January 1990 he had an approval rating of 80 per cent having emerged victorious from the U.S. war in Panama, towards the end of July his ratings had steadily dropped to 60, and were set to drop further.  Thus, President Bush and the corporate-military interests he was supporting were searching for a way to boost military spending and generate renewed public popularity.
The background for Bush’s campaign to maintain high levels of military spending was rooted in the prospects for a U.S. military presence in the Middle East, particularly the Gulf region. When the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, U.S. contingency plans for war in the Gulf region posed Iraq as the enemy.  In January 1990, CIA Director William Webster acknowledged the West’s increasing dependency on Middle East oil in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee.  One month later, General Schwarzkopf advised the Committee to increase the U.S. military presence in the Middle East, describing new plans to intervene in a regional conflict.
The principal vehicle of this operation would be the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), formerly the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, which had been covertly expanding a network of U.S. military-intelligence bases in Saudi Arabia.  Notably, CENTCOM’s War Plan 1002, which was designed during the inception of the Reagan administration to implement the Carter Doctrine of confronting any challenge to U.S. access to Middle East oil by military force, was revised in 1989 and renamed War Plan 1002-90; the last two digits, of course, standing for 1990. In the updated plan, Iraq replaced the Soviet Union as the principal enemy.